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Emerging market economies endure significantly more
macroeconomic volatility than industrial countries. Output volatility
in emerging market economies is more than twice as large as that
in industrial economies, and consumption volatility is three times
as large.1 Recent studies corroborate the view that external factors,
such as terms-of-trade and world interest rate shocks, play an
important role in explaining these differences. For example, Kose
(2002) reports that world price shocks—which include both terms-
of-trade and world real interest rate shocks—account for almost 90
percent of output variation in small open economies. Blankenau,
Kose, and Yi (2001) and Neumeyer and Perri (2004) find that interest
rate shocks account for 30–55 percent of output fluctuations in
emerging market economies.
The significant correlation between these external factors and
domestic macroeconomic volatility is highly suggestive of their key
role, but it does not explain the mechanism through which they
operate. In fact, Caballero (2001) documents that while the Chilean
business cycle is intimately connected to fluctuations in the price of
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copper (the country’s main export good), the economy clearly overreacts
to such fluctuations. Domestic consumption losses in the face of a
sharp decline in the copper price is many times larger than what one
should observe in a frictionless environment. This type of evidence
hints at the presence of strong multiplier effects, of which financial
mechanisms are leading candidates.
Many recent articles along these lines follow the work of Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), in arguing that
external shocks are leveraged by a financial accelerator.2 In these
models, a negative terms-of-trade or interest rate shock not only has
a direct effect on the country, but also reduces its net worth. The
drop in net worth tightens a collateral constraint, which exacerbates
the impact of the external shock. This “collateral squeeze” mechanism
is likely to be an important factor in financial amplification, but is
probably not the only one.3 Returning to the case of Chile discussed
above, a decline in the copper price, by itself, is unlikely to reduce
Chile’s net worth enough to justify the size of the contractions
associated with sharp declines in the price of copper. This has led
several authors to explore credit crunches, in which not only does
net worth decline with external shocks, but specialist investors pull
out resources beyond what the pure net worth decline justifies. 4 On
the empirical front, many papers document the role of the supply
side, through contagion and other mechanisms. One of the most
recent and compelling is Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2005).
They construct an extensive database of sovereign bond prices and
issuances, which they use to demonstrate that the contractionary
behavior of bondholders is central to the rise of interest rate premiums,
especially at long maturities.
The fact that external shocks play a primary role does not liberate
emerging market economies from responsibility. For example, the
presence of extensive liability dollarization reinforces financial
multipliers and overwhelms the traditional stabilization role of
exchange rate depreciations. When financially constrained firms
2. See, for example, Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2003, 2004); Gertler,
Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003); Cook (2004); Devereux and Lane (2003); Christiano,
Gust, and Roldós (2004); Cavallo and others (2005); Mendoza and Smith (2002);
Choi and Cook (2004).
3. See Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) for a model that distinguishes collateral
squeezes from credit crunches.
4. See, for example, Calvo (1999a); Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001);
Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2005).
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borrow in foreign currency while generating their income in local
currency, depreciations of the real exchange rate have a destabilizing
effect on aggregate demand. As originally stressed by Calvo (1999b,
2001) and formalized by Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2003, 2004),
the contractionary effect may overcome the competitiveness channel.
In this case, the exchange rate is no longer a stabilization tool, and
the advantage of a flexible over a fixed exchange rate regime when
dealing with real shocks disappears. The contractionary effect
operates because firms decide not to hedge the exchange rate risk.
Systemic bailout guarantees may be an important element for
understanding such behavior, as argued by Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2001) and Schneider and Tornell (2004).
A question that often arises in these moral hazard models is who
the ultimate guarantor is. If the local government has the resources
to fulfill this function, then it may not be much of an issue after all.
However, the problem of underinsurance may be more pervasive in
emerging market economies and it may emerge even in the absence
of explicit or implicit guarantees. For example, Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2003) demonstrate that when financial constraints
affect borrowing and lending among domestic agents, agents will
not hedge their positions to the socially optimal level, creating an
aggregate underinsurance problem. The reason is a pecuniary
externality, whereby domestic financial frictions depress the expected
rewards of hoarding dollars for crises. That is, on one hand the
possibility of external shocks raises the expected return on hoarding
dollars and reducing dollar liabilities. On the other, limited domestic
intermediation lowers ex-post “arbitrage’’ opportunities and hence
offset some of the private (but not the social) expected gains from
reduced exposure to depreciations.
Another source of domestic vulnerability is the maturity
structure of external liabilities. If an important mismatch develops
between a country’s short-term obligations denominated in foreign
currency and the actual amount of foreign currency to which that
country has access on short notice, then a Diamond-Dybvig run can
ensue, as illustrated by Goldfajn and Valdés (1997) and Chang and
Velasco (2001). Fears regarding the country’s solvency give rise to
liquidity problems as capital inflows fall. Bankruptcies and asset
price collapses follow, validating the initial run.5 Here, too, the
5. See also Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000); Krugman (1999).
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question is why agents do not take these risks into account and
protect themselves by lengthening the maturity structure. One part
of the answer is outlined by Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2005),
who demonstrate that specialist investors are reluctant to provide
long-maturity financing to emerging market economies, especially
during episodes of turmoil. Another part of the answer may involve
domestic undervaluation of the risks associated with the maturity
mismatch. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) develop a model in
which domestic and international collateral constraints interact. A
tightening of the international constraint can generate a large rise
in domestic interest rates and a fire sale of domestic assets, which
cause a contraction in real activity. If banks play a crucial role in
reallocating resources across sectors and if they are affected by the
fall in asset prices, then the initial tightening in the international
financial constraint leads to a contraction in effective domestic
collateral, which contracts output even further. However, domestic
agents may take excessive maturity risk by undervaluing the social
cost of such actions, for reasons of domestic financial
underdevelopment akin to those mentioned above in the context of
liability denomination.
Well managed emerging market economies are able to limit the
extent of underinsurance through regulatory and centralized
precautionary measures. The significant losses associated with sudden
stops have led prudent emerging market economies to pay enormous
costs in order to avoid such crises. Figure 1 shows the ratio of
international reserves to gross domestic product (GDP) held by Chile—
a prudent small open emerging market economy—versus that of several
small open developed economies. The message is clear: Chile holds more
than four times the reserves of its developed counterparts. The cost of
this practice in terms of postponed consumption is large, as by its very
nature an emerging market economy should be anticipating rather
than postponing consumption.
Large reserve holding is just one of the many costs associated
with prudential mechanisms aimed at reducing the impact of capital
flow volatility. It is not uncommon, for example, for economists to
advocate constraints on short-term borrowing, either in the form of
a tax on short-term capital inflows à la Chile in the 1990s (for
example, Eichengreen, Tobin, and Wyplosz, 1995) or the
accumulation of sufficient reserves to fully offset any existing short-
term debt (for example, Greenspan, 1999; Guidotti, 1999; Feldstein,
1999). This advice is costly as well, at least for nondefaulting prudent
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economies, given the significant spreads between short- and long-term
borrowing faced by most emerging market economies. Yet another
cost paid by prudent economies takes the form of severe precautionary
contractions at the first sight of a significant risk of a sudden stop
in capital flows, as illustrated by Caballero and Panageas (2003) for
the case of Chile during the Russian/long-term capital management
(LTCM) crisis.
1. SUMMARY OF THE VOLUME
Given the large costs associated with these precautionary
mechanisms, the question arises as to whether emerging market
economies can do better. This is the organizing theme of this volume,
which consists of three parts: characterization of external shocks,
current policy responses, and new mechanisms to reduce vulnerability.
Part I of this volume, on the characterization of external shocks, is
composed of three papers. Fernando Broner and Roberto Rigobon
document the excess volatility of capital flows to emerging markets
vis-à-vis capital flows to developed economies. They show that no matter
how many controls for demand and supply factors one includes in a
variety of regressions, the residual volatility in emerging market
economies is about twice as large as that in developed.
Figure 1. Ratio of International Reserves to GDP for
Selected Countries
Source: World Development Indicators (online).
a. The horizontal line is the average of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
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César Calderón, Norman Loayza, and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
conduct a comprehensive cross-country panel study of the response
of growth to trade openness, financial openness, and external shocks,
as well as to the interaction between these sets of factors. They
find that upper-middle-income countries benefit the most from both
forms of openness, as their average rate of growth rises significantly.
They also find that trade openness tends to dampen the growth
effect of trade-related shocks while amplifying the shocks related
to financial markets. Interestingly, financial openness tends to have
the opposite effect.
Helmut Franken, Guillermo Le Fort, and Eric Parrado study
the determinants of the Chilean business cycle since the 1950s using
vector autoregressive methods. Their clearest conclusion, given the
natural identification through block exogeneity of these shocks, is
that real and financial external shocks have played a dominant role
throughout. They also tentatively conclude that the Chilean economy
has become more resilient to external shocks, despite the increased
synchronization with global cycles brought about by deeper
integration in world markets. Finally, they provide preliminary
evidence for their conjecture that the extra resilience is due to better
countercyclical policy management.
Part II, on current policy responses, contains five articles. It starts
with the paper by Luis Felipe Céspedes, Ilan Goldfajn, Phil Lowe, and
Rodrigo Valdés, which draws common lessons from the recent
experiences of Australia, Brazil, and Chile. These economies are subject
to fairly similar shocks, but they are at different stages of macroeconomic
and institutional development. The main lessons come in the form of a
menu whose options are determined and constrained by these stages of
development. The actual set of potential policies—in particular, the
possibility of implementing countercyclical policies—depends on the
health of initial macroeconomic conditions, such as the stock of public
debt, the current account deficit, the extent of pass-through, and the
level of inflation. It also depends on the level of institutional
development, such as the degree of openness, fiscal responsibility, and
financial depth, on whether there is a policy framework in place, and
on the balance sheet exposures of the private and public sector. To
enjoy sufficient flexibility in trying times, the authorities’ actions
during these times must not be perceived as deviations from a stable
and credible medium-term framework. This requires an effort to build
credibility in good times and to ensure transparency with respect to
any exceptional action.
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Pablo García and Claudio Soto evaluate the recent trend among
emerging market economies, especially in Asia, to accumulate large
amounts of international reserves. They build a simple model of self-
fulfilling crises, in which reserve accumulation reduces the chance of
the country experiencing a run (that is, a sudden stop of capital
inflows). They estimate the probability of a crisis as a function of
several determinants, ranging from liquidity to institutional variables,
using annual data for eighty countries since 1975. Limited liquidity,
measured as a low ratio of reserves to short-term debt, a real exchange
rate overvaluation, and low growth are all factors that exacerbate the
risk of a crisis. Interestingly, they feed this hazard function into their
model and conclude that the large levels of reserve accumulation are
commensurate with the benefits they bring in reducing the chance of
costly sudden stops. In fact, they argue that it would not be
unreasonable for emerging market economies to build war chests of
reserves that exceed their current levels.
Kevin Cowan, Erwin Hansen, and Luis Óscar Herrera conduct a
detailed analysis of the degree and patterns of currency exposure in
Chilean nonfinancial corporations over the last decade. They build a
unique dataset in which they supplement accounting data for
approximately 150 nonfinancial firms over the period 1995–2003 (taken
from the Ficha Estadística Codificada Uniforme, or FECUs) with
information on dollar debt and assets, exports, derivatives, and
ownership. Their conclusions are stark: in Chile, firms with higher
dollar debt do not underperform (underinvest) in periods following a
depreciation of the exchange rate. The main reason for this is not
that balance sheet effects are absent, but that Chilean firms are
matched. High dollar debt comes in combination with high dollar
assets, currency derivatives, and export orientation of the firm.
Matching holds particularly for firms that are likely to be financially
constrained and for the period of flexible exchange rates.
Esteban Jadresic and Jorge Selaive explore the effectiveness of a
foreign exchange derivatives market in reducing currency risk. Their
main focus is on Chile, in particular the recent floating exchange rate
period, but they also conduct a series of tests using both high frequency
time series for Chile and lower frequency cross-country panels. They
offer suggestive preliminary evidence supporting the view that
developing the foreign exchange derivatives markets reduces
microeconomic and macroeconomic currency risk.
Finally, Sebastián Edwards reviews the arguments for and
against capital controls and provides new evidence of their
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ineffectiveness in reducing external vulnerability. After estimating
a hazard model of capital and current account reversals, he concludes
that restrictions on capital mobility do not have a significant effect
on the probability that a country will experience a reversal. If
anything, there is some weak evidence—subject to difficult-to-resolve
identification issues—suggesting that countries with greater
restrictions have a higher probability of reversal.
Part III, on new mechanisms to reduce volatility, contains three
articles. The first is by Kenneth Kletzer who synthesizes recent
developments in the sovereign debt literature and draws out the
optimal features of contingent liabilities and financial instruments.
Sovereign immunity limits the amount of international risk sharing
that is feasible. However, some amount of debt renegotiation is not
inconsistent with good incentives and is generally welfare enhancing
if it can occur in a costless fashion. Similar results can be obtained
with GDP- and commodity-indexed bonds. By the same token, optimal
implicit contracts with contingent interest payments can be
implemented through interest rate swap markets. The specific form
of information asymmetries is important in determining the optimal
stripping of the countries’ contingent liabilities. More generally,
financial market innovation should be aimed at reducing renegotiation
costs and deepening international capital markets by increasing risk
sharing, while respecting self-enforcement constraints.
Francisco Gallego and Geraint Jones revisit fear of floating from an
optimal policy perspective. Is constrained flexibility an optimal response
to noisy financial shocks? Or does it simply reflect a time-consistent
but suboptimal policy? The benefit of constrained flexibility is based
on the need to build inflation credibility and protect dollarized balance
sheets, as in Calvo and Reinhart (2002). The benefit of exchange rate
flexibility, in turn, is based on the need to provide the private sector
with the right incentives to insure against crises; since this is an ex
ante mechanism, however, ex post the central bank has an incentive
to renege, as in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005). The authors
conclude that a compromise could be struck by using noncrisis periods
to stabilize the exchange rate and crisis periods to provide insurance
incentives (that is, let the exchange rate float freely). Nevertheless,
countries that are at early stages of free-floating may not enjoy the
luxury of this state-contingent policy and may have to free-float at
all times. In the empirical part of their paper, they reexamine the
fear-of-floating findings from this refined perspective, and they find
support for their predictions. In particular, among the free-floaters,
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those that have established the credibility of their regime are able to
use optimal state-contingent policies, employing a free-float more
actively during sudden stop episodes.
Finally, Ricardo Caballero and Stavros Panageas argue that while
the possibility of sudden stops indeed raises the need to accumulate
reserves, it does not support the current practice of holding reserves in
the form of noncontingent foreign bonds and deposits. They first develop
a simple portfolio model in which sudden stops correspond to shocks
that raise the marginal value of a dollar of reserves. Not surprisingly,
the optimal portfolio of reserves should include assets that, on average,
yield high returns during sudden stops, which is not the case with the
conventional instruments held by central banks (U.S. Treasury bonds
yield more or less the same return in all states of nature). They go on to
estimate the key parameters of the model using data for several
emerging market economies in the 1990s, and they find globally traded
instruments that satisfy the above condition. For example, they show
that, historically, the VIX (implicit volatility index extracted from the
price of derivatives on a few S&P500 firms) has jumped in almost every
episode of systemic emerging market sudden stops. Optimally adding
call options on the VIX to reserves would increase the stock of reserves,
on average, by 30 percent during sudden stops. Concretely, the Central
Bank of Chile would have made a capital gain of approximately US$6
billion during the sudden stop following the Russian/LTCM crisis. This
amounts to more dollars than its entire intervention during that trying
period, and it exceeds the current account reversal experienced by Chile.
2. TAKING STOCK
Several policy lessons emerge from the papers presented in this
volume. From a medium- to long-term perspective, Calderón, Loayza,
and Schmidt-Hebbel find that policies promoting increased integration
with international goods and capital markets may help sustain higher
growth rates and dampen the negative effects of external shocks.
Financial integration helps dampen the volatility effects of adverse
financial shocks, while trade integration may dampen the impact of
trade-related shocks. Broner and Rigobon’s work suggests that some
of these conclusions are also likely to carry on to higher frequency
as capital flow volatility is reduced by improved financial markets
and institutions.
From a short- to medium-term perspective, Céspedes, Goldfajn,
Lowe, and Valdés describe the ideal policy framework for dealing with
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external shocks, based on the experiences of Australia, Brazil, and
Chile. This policy arrangement includes a floating exchange rate
regime, a credible medium-term inflation-targeting regime, a
sustainable and credible fiscal policy, and liquid and well-developed
financial markets. Perhaps most importantly, they argue
convincingly—as does Woodford (2003)—that a key aspect of success
with discretionary policy in exceptional times is to have a transparent
and credible policy framework in place.
Jadresic and Selaive suggest that flexible exchange rates—as a
tool to reduce emerging market economies’ vulnerability to external
shocks—are more effective in the presence of a well-developed foreign
exchange derivatives market, which reduces aggregate currency risk.
Cowan, Hansen, and Herrera demonstrate that floating exchange rates
and derivatives have helped Chilean firms to reduce currency exposure
since 1999. Finally, Gallego and Jones suggest the application of state-
contingent flexibility in exchange rate policies to deal with issues such
as sudden stops and fear of floating.
As for less standard mechanisms, Kletzer proposes the
introduction of contract innovations in international debt
renegotiation to reduce the volatility of external debt. Specifically,
he recommends the development of derivatives contracts to
implement risk sharing and eliminate bond renegotiation. These
derivative contracts may allow debtors to reduce default and
restructuring risk for bondholders. Caballero and Panageas similarly
propose better risk management practices for central banks. They
suggest that portfolios encompassing (riskier) assets that are
correlated with sudden stops are superior to a simple strategy of
reserve accumulation. As an illustration, they find that the cost of
facing sudden stops would be substantially reduced if a central bank
held contracts on the S&P implied volatility index.
In conclusion, emerging market economies face substantial real
and financial volatility. While a significant component of this volatility
is exogenous to them, it does not mean that domestic policy is of
secondary importance. Quite the opposite: facing large volatility makes
good domestic policy decisions all the more important. This volume is
an attempt to characterize the main external shocks affecting emerging
market economies, the sources of structural weaknesses, and the best
policy frameworks for dealing with these problems. Some of the policy
lessons come from reasonably well-traveled roads, as they are derived
from actual experiences documented through case and panel studies.
Yet others are derived from normative analysis, and only hint at the
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elements that future policies ought to have. We tried to strike a
balance and achieve some continuity between both, as our goal was
not only to document but also to move forward a policy agenda that
puts the concept of country insurance at the heart of policy design.
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